

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:JWSHINN/DB

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EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR

S/S: MR. GAMMON

EA:RLSNEIDER (SUBSTANCE)

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY ROME

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230822

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA

SUBJECT: JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN PRINCIPLES DECLARATION

REF: STATE 226855

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL CALLED IN
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DANISH AMBASSADOR BARTELS NOVEMBER 21 TO PROTEST EC NINE'S
LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH USG PRIOR TO EC'S GIVING PAPER
TO GOJ PROPOSING EC-JAPANESE DECLARATION (REFTEL). EA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SNEIDER ALSO PARTICIPATED IN

MEETING. END SUMMARY.

2. PROPOSED EC-JAPAN DECLARATION: STOESSEL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT EC PAPER WAS PRESENTED TO JAPANESE ON NOVEMBER 14, WHEREAS WE DID NOT RECEIVE IT UNTIL NOVEMBER 15. WE WERE SURPRISED THAT NINE HAD MADE THIS APPROACH TO THE JAPANESE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH US, ESPECIALLY SINCE US-EC NINE MEETING IN COPENHAGEN NOVEMBER 14 WOULD HAVE PROVIDED IDEAL OCCASION FOR SUCH CONSULTATION. STOESSEL STRESSED THAT ISSUE OF JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN A DECLARATION IS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO US-JAPAN RELATIONS, AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON EC NINE PROPOSAL BEFORE IT WAS SUBMITTED TO JAPANESE. FURTHER, US HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE JAPAN IN SOME WAY IN A SEPARATE DECLARATION INVOLVING US, EC-NINE AND JAPAN. WE HOPE, HE SAID, THAT EC NINE WILL ENDEAVOR

HENCEFORTH TO CONSULT WITH US ON ANY FURTHER PROPOSALS RELATED TO JAPAN'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE DECLARATION ENTERPRISE.

3. CONCERNING THE POINT MADE IN PARA 5 OF EC PAPER (REFTEL), STOESSEL SAID US FAILS TO SEE WHY INCLUSION OF US, EC, JAPAN AND OTHERS IN A GENERAL DECLARATION WOULD DETRACT IN ANY WAY FROM IMPACT OF DECLARATIONS WHICH EC MIGHT CONCLUDE BILATERALLY WITH US OR OTHERS. ESPECIALLY, STOESSEL SAID, US CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATION THAT INCLUDING THE US IN A US-EC-JAPANESE DECLARATION WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH A DOCUMENT.

4. BARTELS SAID THAT HE AGREED COMPLETELY THAT EC NINE SHOULD HAVE CONSULTED WITH US BEFORE SUBMITTING DOCUMENT TO JAPANESE. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED DOCUMENT ON NOVEMBER 13 BUT HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED TO GIVE IT TO DEPARTMENT UNTIL NOVEMBER 15, WHICH HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED WAS AFTER IT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO GOJ.

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5. CONCERNING PARAGRAPH 5, BARTELS SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN AS TO PRECISE MEANING OF LANGUAGE, BUT BELIEVED WHAT EC NINE HAD IN MIND WAS THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND EUROPE, US AND JAPAN, AND EUROPE AND JAPAN WERE OBVIOUSLY DISSIMILAR, AND THAT DEVELOPMENT OF MEANINGFUL SINGLE DOCUMENT THEREFORE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SECURITY ISSUES, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE VERY HARD TO BRING INTO ANY TRILATERAL DOCUMENT, SINCE THE NINE WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH JAPAN IN ANY DECLARATION DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE. IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE PARTIES ALSO IS DISSIMILAR. ALTHOUGH ALL THREE ARE MEMBERS OF GATT, IMF, AND OECD, ISSUES BEING HANDLED IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS

SHOULD REMAIN THERE. THUS, BARTELS ASKED, WHAT WOULD BE GAINED BY CONCLUDING A TRILATERAL DECLARATION DEALING WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES WHEN THE DECLARATION WOULD ONLY SAY THAT THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO COOPERATE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES IN EXISTING NEGOTIATING FORA? ON OTHER HAND, IN A BILATERAL DOCUMENT, NINE AND JAPAN COULD DEFINE COOPERATION IN A MEANINGFUL WAY, AND IN DIFFERENT WAY THAN US-EC COOPERATION OR US-JAPAN COOPERATION COULD BE DEFINED. THIS, IN BARTELS VIEW, IS MAIN ADVANTAGE OF SEPARATE EC NINE-JAPAN DECLARATION APPROACH.

6. SNEIDER SAID THAT IT WAS FOR PRECISELY REASONS BARTELS MENTIONED THAT THERE EXISTS A NEED FOR A TRILATERAL DECLARATION. THERE HAS BEEN A HISTORICAL EC TENDENCY TO DEAL WITH JAPAN ON A DIFFERENT BASIS THAN THE US TREATS JAPAN, AND IF THIS DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH

CONTINUES IT ULTIMATELY WILL BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL THREE PARTIES. SNEIDER STRESSED THE NEED TO BRING JAPAN INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY, AND SAID THAT, IF JAPAN AGAIN TURNS INWARD IN ITS FOCUS, AS HAS OCCURRED PREVIOUSLY IN THIS CENTURY, IT COULD BECOME A POWERFUL AND UNPREDICTABLE FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND THE IMPACT OF SUCH A SHIFT WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO ASIA ALONE. SNEIDER CONTINUED THAT THE US HAS SHOULDERED THE BURDEN FOR MAINTAINING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN
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FOR A LONG TIME, AND FRANKLY WE NOW FEEL THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THIS SPECIAL ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE BROADENED. THIS CANNOT BE DONE IN THE OECD, GATT OR THE IMF. THUS, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT JAPAN SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A TRILATERAL DOCUMENT. SNEIDER SAID JAPANESE FEEL REBUFFED BY EC REJECTION OF SINGLE DECLARATION PROPOSAL AND, IN TYPICALLY ASIAN FASHION, MAY NOT BE PRESSING THIS APPROACH IN CONTACTS WITH EC AS ENERGETICALLY AS THEY ARE WITH THE US. THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS LACK OF JAPANESE INTEREST IN THIS APPROACH HOWEVER.

7. BARTELS SAID HE AGREED WITH MUCH OF WHAT SNEIDER HAD SAID, BUT WHEN IT COMES TO ECONOMIC ISSUES, THESE ARE SO COMPLEX THAT HE BELIEVED INCLUDING JAPAN IN A TRILATERAL DECLARATION WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. BARTELS SAID, WHEN DANES AND SOME OTHER EUROPEANS FIRST HEARD SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH THEY INTERPRETED IT AS A US EFFORT TO EXPAND NATO TO INCLUDE JAPAN. BARTELS SAID THE US HAS A GLOBAL POLICY, AS DR. KISSINGER HAD ACCURATELY INDICATED IN HIS APRIL 23 SPEECH, WHILE THE NINE HAVE A REGIONAL POLICY. WHILE HE PERSONALLY FELT EUROPE'S REGIONAL OUTLOOK, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EC'S "NOT TOO PRAISEWORTHY" PERFORMANCE IN THE

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, WAS SHORT-SIGHTED, IT NONETHELESS CONTINUES TO BE THE EUROPEAN OUTLOOK. THUS, THE NINE, WITH THIS REGIONAL FOCUS, ARE SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT THEY SEE AS A US EFFORT TO BROADEN THE EUROPEAN WORLD-VIEW BY INCLUDING JAPAN IN THE DECLARATION ENTERPRISE.

8. BARTELS SAID THE EC NINE ALSO FEEL THAT US INSISTENCE ON A TRILATERAL DOCUMENT REFLECTS A US EFFORT TO "TURN THE CLOCK BACK" BY INSURING EUROPEAN SUBORDINATION TO US DESIDERATA IN A SINGLE DECLARATION. BARTELS SAID THE EC NINE ACCEPT US LEADERSHIP ON SECURITY ISSUES BUT NOT ON OTHER ISSUES, AND BELIEVES IT SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN IDENTITY IN THESE OTHER AREAS. HE BELIEVED SERIES OF BILATERAL DECLARATIONS WOULD BEST SERVE THIS PURPOSE. BARTELS ALSO SAID THAT THOUGH THE US INSISTS THAT JAPAN FAVORS A SINGLE,

TRILATERAL DECLARATION, THE EC HAS FIRM INDICATIONS
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FROM JAPANESE DIPLOMATS IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS THAT THEY REALIZE THIS APPROACH IS UNREALISTIC, AND ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A BILATERAL DECLARATION. THUS, BARTELS SAID, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD OF COURSE REPORT US VIEWS FULLY HE BELIEVED EC NINE POSITION ON JAPANESE PARTICIPATION PROBLEM WAS FIRM, AND THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO SECURE A REVERSAL. BARTELS CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY FOR THIS REASON THAT EC HAD CONCLUDED IT SERVED NO USEFUL PURPOSE TO ENGAGE IN PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH US ON EC NINE PAPER. BARTELS ADDED THAT FACT CANADIANS HAD INDICATED A PREFERENCE FOR A BILATERAL DECLARATION WITH THE EC NINE HAD REINFORCED NINE ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE.

9. US-EC DECLARATION: BARTELS REFERRED TO THE SENTENCE IN COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER NOVEMBER 20 MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS STATING THAT DECLARATION DRAFTING EXERCISE "IS CONTINUING IN A MOST SATISFACTORY WAY," AND SAID HE SHARED THIS ASSESSMENT, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY FELT THE NATO DECLARATION WAS A BETTER DOCUMENT, AND THAT US-EC TEXT WAS SOMEWHAT INADEQUATE. HE DOUBTED, HOWEVER, TEXT COULD BE IMPROVED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY DUE TO GREAT SENSITIVITY ON PART OF SOME OF EC NINE MEMBERS ON GETTING TOO DEEPLY INVOLVED WITH THE US IN US-EC NINE ECONOMIC DOCUMENT. HE SAID HE ALSO PERSONALLY SHARED ORIGINAL US PREFERENCE FOR SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT, BUT FELT THIS WAS OUT OF QUESTION FOR THE TIME BEING, AS A RESULT OF RESISTANCE BY SOME EC MEMBERS. BARTELS SUGGESTED, ON PERSONAL BASIS, THAT BEST WAY TO SPEED COMPLETION OF US-EC DOCUMENT MIGHT BE TO HOLD A MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY KISSINGER AND ALL EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE TIME OF THE DEC 10 NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING. BARTELS SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, US WAS MISTAKEN

IN RESTRICTING ITS HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ON THE DECLARATION ISSUE PRIMARILY TO MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS OF UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY, AND THAT BY INCREASING CONTACTS WITH ALL EC FOREIGN MINISTERS, US VIEWS WOULD RECEIVE GREATER WEIGHT IN EC DELIBERATIONS.

10. IN REPLY, STOESSEL SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE NOVEMBER 14 MEETING IN COPENHAGEN HAD REFLECTED SOME PROGRESS ON THE US-EC DECLARATION, AND WE WERE CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT, THERE STILL
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REMAIN DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON SEVERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS. STOESSEL SAID HE FELT DECLARATION EXERCISE HAD BY NOW DRAGGED ON SO LONG IT HAD EVOLVED INTO A TECHNICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EXPERTS, AND THAT THE EMOTION AND HOPED-FOR CREATIVE SPARK OF THE ORIGINAL US PROPOSAL HAD BEEN DRAINED FROM THE EXERCISE. STOESSEL SAID US DOES NOT INTEND

INITIATE A CALL FOR ANOTHER MEETING WITH THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS. AS FAR AS BARTELS SUGGESTION FOR A MEETING OF THE TEN FOREIGN MINISTERS WAS CONCERNED, WE WOULD OF COURSE CONSIDER THE SUGGESTION CAREFULLY.

11. FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES: YOU SHOULD FIND SUITABLE OCCASION TO BRING SUBSTANCE OF POINTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 2, 3 AND 6 ABOVE TO ATTENTION OF APPROPRIATE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS. KISSINGER

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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